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Abstract
In this paper, we show that considering the classic Allingham and Sandmo (1972) tax compliance
problem under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) axiomatics provides a simple explana-
tion for the “excess” level of full compliance observed in empirical studies, and which standard
Expected Utility (EU) axiomatics are unable to explain. RDEU axiomatics provide a compelling
answer to this puzzle, without the need for the moral sentiments or stigma arguments that have
recently been advanced in the literature. Formally, we show that the threshold audit probability
at which full compliance becomes optimal for the consumer is signiﬁcantly lower under RDEU
axiomatics than in the EU case. We also show that the comparative statics of tax-evasion with
respect to changes in the tax rate or in income are “weaker” than under EU axiomatics. We
conclude by presenting numerical simulations using several diﬀerent parameterizations of the prob-
ability weighting function that have been proposed in the literature.
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Since the seminal article by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), most authors dealing with the
issue of tax compliance have had great diﬃculty in making their theoretical models square
with empirical or experimental results. The most glaring example is the tendency of many
individuals to engage in no tax evasion at all.
A ﬁrst common reaction has been to “improve” upon the initial model. Yitzhaki’s
(1974) contribution was to assume that the penalty for non-compliance is proportional to
the amount of taxes evaded, while Pencavel (1979) endogenized income by jointly consider-
ing labor supply along with tax compliance. Koskela (1983) considers the nature of penalty
schemes (charged on undeclared income or on the amount of tax evaded). Pestieau and
Possen (1991), for their part, included the choice of activity by the consumer, where each
sector varies in the opportunities available for evasion. Engel and Hines (1994) focused
upon the repeated nature of the problem and explored its dynamics. Finally Graetz, Rein-
ganum and Wilde (1986), and Beck and Jung (1989) introduced strategic concerns: the
former endogenized the audit probability within a principal-agent framework, in which the
audit probability becomes a function of the amount of income declared; the latter used
game-theoretic tools to model the interaction between the taxpayer and the tax authorities.
While these developments have been both interesting and important, most observers
of the literature agree that they still do not allow one to reconcile theory with observed
empirics (see e.g. the survey by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998). As a result, a
number of authors have introduced new constraints, derived from psychological arguments,
in an eﬀort to explain the “excessive” level of observed compliance. Spicer and Lundstedt
(1976), for example, considered the degree of satisfaction felt by the taxpayer with respect
to his government. Erard and Feinstein (1994) included notions of guilt and shame in the
taxpayer’s objective function. While the heuristic appeal of these arguments is undeniable,
they remain, however, diﬃcult to justify on purely economic grounds.
A second approach has been to raise doubts concerning the expected utility framework
1initially adopted by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Slemrod (1992), for example, summa-
rizes a large corpus of empirical and experimental literature that ﬁnds a subjective proba-
bility of audit that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from (and larger than) the observed objective
p r o b a b i l i t i e s .O u rp a p e rp i c k su po nt h i si d e aa si t sp o i n to fd e p a r t u r e ,a n dt a k e sa i ma tt h e
fundamental building-block of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) approach: the expected
utility (EU) model of von Neumann and Morgenstern. As such, we formalize the Alling-
ham and Sandmo (1972) problem under alternative axiomatics, using the Rank-Dependent
Expected Utility (RDEU) model.1
The RDEU approach was initially developed by Quiggin (1982) in order to address a
number of important weaknesses that had become apparent in the EU approach.2 Under
RDEU axiomatics, the linearity in probabilities of the EU model is replaced by a weighting
function which assigns weights to the probabilities of the diﬀerent states of nature, where
the weights are themselves functions of the rank of the given state of nature, in terms of the
level of satisfaction that the individual derives.
As applied to tax compliance, we prefer the RDEU approach to its main competitor, Cu-
mulative Prospect Theory (CPT), developed in a series of papers beginning with Kahneman
and Tversky (1979). CPT does, as noted by Cowell (2003), present a number of advantages.
First, individuals “edit” the information associated with the underlying lotteries. Second,
and contrary to the RDEU approach, CPT allows one to distinguish the value function (as
opposed to the utility function) from the weighting function associated with the probabilities
1 Our paper therefore constitutes a response to the question posed by Cowell (2003, p. 9): “Would
relaxing this assumption to encompass non-EU models -such as rank-dependent utility or prospect theory-
result in a more promising underlying story?”
2 While the Allais (1953) paradox had already revealed signiﬁcant deﬁciencies in terms of the explanatory
power of the EU approach in risky situations and, in particular, calls the Independence Axiom into question
(as noted by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), Savage’s construct was unable to account for the Ellsberg
paradox (1961). In addition, the EU approach results in the utility function playing two roles: on the one
hand it describes the decision-maker’s attitudes toward risk (risk aversion ﬂows from the concavity of the
utility function); on the other, it describes an individual’s preferences in situations in which risk is absent
(concavity simply denotes decreasing marginal utility). The EU approach is therefore incompatible with a
situation in which, for example, an individual would have decreasing marginal utility but a certain taste
for risk-taking. Finally, the EU model does not allow one to distinguish between optimistic and pessimistic
decisionmakers. All of these limitations are addressed by the RDEU approach (see e.g. Starmer, 2000).
2of given gains or losses. On the other hand, and in the context of tax compliance we believe
this argument to be the clincher, CPT imposes a reference point.3 This last hypothesis
implies that consumers should be indiﬀerent to wealth eﬀects, which runs counter to all
empirical evidence that indicates that the degree of fraud is positively correlated with the
consumer’s level of income.
Finally, note that Bernasconi (1998) analyzes tax compliance using the notion of ﬁrst-
order risk-aversion, introduced into the literature by Segal and Spivak (1990). In a two
states of nature example (which corresponds exactly to the Allingham and Sandmo tax
compliance problem) the particularity of Segal and Spivak’s approach is that an individual’s
indiﬀerence curves possess a kink along the 45 degree line (which corresponds to perfect
insurance). Formally, individual preferences admit points of non-diﬀerentiability, where risk-
aversion is of order one. This property arises naturally under RDEU axiomatics. Indeed,
Bernasconi (1998) illustrates his results using a numerical simulation based on a RDEU
model in which the parameterization is borrowed from the empirical work of Camerer and
Ho (1994). Our paper can thus be seen as a natural extension to Bernasconi’s work, in which
RDEU axiomatics are posed both explicitly and right from the start.
T h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s .I np a r t2w ei n t r o d u c et h eb a s i cn o t a t i o nt h a tw eu s e
and express the Allingham and Sandmo problem in terms of RDEU axiomatics. We then
present our main theoretical result which shows that full compliance is “easier” to obtain
under RDEU axiomatics than under EU axiomatics. Formally speaking, this is expressed by
the fact that the threshold audit probability at which full compliance becomes optimal for the
consumer is lower under RDEU axiomatics than in the EU case. A Corollary establishes
that the comparative statics of cheating with respect to changes in the tax rate or in income
are “weaker” than under EU axiomatics. We then perform numerical simulations using
the parameterizations of the probability weighting function proposed by Camerer and Ho
(1994), Tversky and Fox (1995) and Prelec (1998), and examine: (i) the minimal penalty
3 This hypothesis translates the existence of a status quo, and corresponds to the normalization that
u(0) = 0.
3rate needed to ensure full compliance, (ii) the proportion of income that is declared. These
simulations show that RDEU axiomatics combined with the Prelec (1998) parameterization
of the probability weighting function provide a coherent explanation of the tax-compliance
puzzle.
2 Allingham-Sandmo (1972) under RDEU Axiomatics
2.1 Basic notation
In the RDEU approach, the independence axiom of expected utility theory is replaced by the
axiom of the comonotone sure thing (Chateauneuf , 1999). The set X of riskless alternatives
is a nonempty compact topological space. A lottery is a probability measure with ﬁnite
support on X, typically denoted by P =( p1,x 1;...;pi,x i;...;pn,x n) where x1,...,xn ∈ X,
pi > 0 for all i,a n d
Pn
i=1 pi =1 . The set of all lotteries is L(X). A riskless alternative
x ∈ X is identiﬁed with the lottery (1,x) ∈ L(X).
The preferences of an RDEU decisionmaker are characterized by two functions, u and ϕ,
that are continuous and increasing. The function u : R −→ R deﬁn e du pt oam o n o t o n e
increasing transformation, plays the role of a utility function under certainty; the function
ϕ :[ 0 ,1] −→ [0,1], which satisﬁes the restrictions ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1, is unique and plays
the role of a probability transformation function. For a decision-maker with utility function
u(.), preferences over L(X) can be modelled by RDEU if there exists a weighting function
ϕ(.), such that preferences are represented by the functional ERDEU [.]:L(X) −→ R deﬁned
by:
ERDEU [P]=
n−1 X
j=1
Ã
ϕ
Ã
n X
i=j
pρ(i)
!
− ϕ
Ã
n X
i=j+1
pρ(i)
!!
u
¡
xρ(j)
¢
+ ϕ
¡
pρ(n)
¢
u
¡
xρ(n)
¢
,
where ρ(.) is a permutation that orders the riskless alternatives in the lottery from worse to
4best, i.e. u(x1) 6 ... 6 u(xn) (Quiggin, 1982).4
2.2 The model
In the Yitzhaki (1974) version of the standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972) problem, the
penalty faced by the taxpayer in the case of an audit is proportional to the amount of
tax avoided, when the taxpayer engages in a positive amount of avoidance. Consider the
lottery P (z)=( p, e y − θtz;1− p, e y + tz),w h e r ep is the probability of being audited, e y is
the taxpayer’s after tax income, t is the tax rate, θ is the penalty rate if fraud is detected,
and z is the amount of underreporting by the taxpayer5. The taxpayer’s objective function
is given by
RDEU [P (z)] = ϕ(1 − p)u(e y + tz)+( 1− ϕ(1 − p))u(e y − θtz). (1)
The solution to the taxpayer’s optimization problem when her preferences are described by
RDEU axiomatics is given by:
z
∗
RDEU ≡ argmax
z>0
RDEU [P (z)]. (2)
The necessary First Order Condition (FOC) which characterizes the solution deﬁn e di n( 2 )
is given by:
t
£
ϕ(1 − p)u
0 ¡
e y + tz
∗
RDEU
¢
− θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]u
0 ¡
e y − θtz
∗
RDEU
¢¤
+ λ =0 , (3)
4 We present the deﬁnition of ERDEU[P (z)] in terms of a decumulative density function (i.e., 1 minus
the cumulative density), whereas, in his illustration of the kink, Bernasconi (1998) uses a cumulative density
function formulation.
5 Note that we assume z > 0.I fo n eh a dz<0, the structure of the optimization program implies that the
taxpayer would receive a reward for over-declaration (this follows because of the formulation in terms of a
penalty: −θtz∗ > 0 if z∗ < 0). As such, we prefer to assume, as in Andreoni et al (1998) that overdeclaration
is irrational.
5where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint z > 0. Since the Second
Order Condition (SOC) is given by:
t
2 £
ϕ(1 − p)u
00 ¡
e y + tz
∗
RDEU
¢
+ θ
2 [1 − ϕ(1 − p)]pu
00¡
e y − θtz
∗
RDEU
¢¤
< 0,
which always holds because of the strict concavity of the utility function u(.),( 3 )i ss u ﬃcient
as well as being necessary. From Kuhn-Tucker, complementary slackness implies λz∗
RDEU =0 .
Now rewrite (3) as:
−λ = tθ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]u
0 ¡
e y + tz
∗
RDEU
¢
"
ϕ(1 − p)
θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]
−
u0 ¡
e y − θtz∗
RDEU
¢
u0 ¡
e y + tz∗
RDEU
¢
#
. (4)
Two cases will arise because of complementary slackness. First, we may have z∗
RDEU =0 ,i n
which case λ>0. Rearranging (4) implies that:
−λ = tθ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]u
0 (e y)
·
ϕ(1 − p)
θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]
− 1
¸
< 0,
which can only be true for (1 + θ)ϕ(1 − p)−θ<0, but is impossible because (1 + θ)ϕ(1 − p)−
θ>0.S e c o n d ,w em a yh a v ez∗
RDEU > 0,i nw h i c hc a s eλ =0and (4) can be rewritten as:
ϕ(1 − p)
θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]
=
u0 ¡
e y − θtz∗
RDEU
¢
u0 ¡
e y + tz∗
RDEU
¢ ≡ f
¡
z
∗
RDEU;e y,t,θ
¢
. (5)
B yi n s p e c t i o no f( 5 )i ti si m m e d i a t et h a tfz∗
¡
z∗
RDEU;.
¢
> 0. Moreover, it is equally clear that
f (0;.)=1 . Therefore (5) cannot hold when (1 + θ)ϕ(1 − p) − θ<0 and can only obtain
when (1 + θ)ϕ(1 − p)−θ > 0. By the Theorem of the Maximum, z∗
RDEU as implicitly deﬁned
by (5) is continuous in p. More formally, consider the partial inverse of f with respect to
z∗
RDEU, which we shall denote by ψ,w h e r eψ
¡
f
¡
z∗
RDEU;e y,t,θ
¢
;e y,t,θ
¢
= z∗
RDEU.I tf o l l o w s
that ψ(f (0;.);.)=ψ(1;.)=0 .S i n c ef is increasing, so is its inverse: ψf (f;.) > 0.F r o m
6the preceding discussion:
z
∗
RDEU (p;e y,t,θ)=

 
 
ψ
³
ϕ(1−p)
θ[1−ϕ(1−p)];e y,t,θ
´
,ϕ(1 − p) − θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)] > 0
0,o t h e r w i s e
(6)
If we pose ϕ(p)=p for every p ∈ [0,1], then we are back to Expected Utility axiomatics,
and one obtains the following result:
z
∗
EU (p;e y,t,θ)=

 
 
ψ
³
1−p
θp ;e y,t,θ
´
,1 − p − θp > 0
0,o t h e r w i s e
(7)
This result is a standard one in the tax-compliance literature (see e.g. Andreoni et al (1998)).
Since ϕ(.) is a strictly increasing function from [0,1] to [0,1],i t si n v e r s eϕ−1 (.) is so as
well and the condition ϕ(1 − p) − θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)] > 0 can be rewritten as:
p 6 1 − ϕ
−1
µ
θ
1+θ
¶
= p
∗
RDEU (θ).
We then have the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 The taxpayer’s optimal compliance behavior is given by:
z
∗
RDEU (p;e y,t,θ)=

 
 
ψ
³
ϕ(1−p)
θ[1−ϕ(1−p)];e y,t,θ
´
,p < p ∗
RDEU (θ)
0,o t h e r w i s e
(8)
Experimental studies show that the probability weighting function (ϕ(.)) is inverse S-
shaped (ﬁrst concave, then convex), overweighting low probabilities and underweighting high
probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman,1991, Abdellaoui, 2000). The probability weighting
function therefore satisﬁes the condition that:
∃ b p ∈ [0,1], such that ϕ(b p)=b p.
7Moreover, we have: 
 
 
∀p<b pϕ (p) >p
∀p>b pϕ (p) <p
For Prelec (1998), “the overweighting of small probabilities, below the ﬁxed point (b p), en-
hances the attraction of small-p gains (lottery tickets) and the aversion to small-p losses
(audit), while the underweighting of larger probabilities above the ﬁxed point, diminishes
the attraction of larger-p gains (underdeclaration without auditing) and the aversion to
larger-p losses.” Prelec (1998) also establishes that b p,t h eﬁxed point of ϕ(.), lies between
0.2 and 0.4. Decidue and Wakker (2001) specify that: “Descriptively, a pessimistic attitude
can result from irrational belief that unfavorable events tend to happen more often, leading
to an unrealistic overweighting of unfavorable likehoods (Murphy’s law).” In what follows,
we assume:
Condition 1
ϕ(1 − p) < 1 − p
Condition 1 boils down to assuming one of three things. First, ϕ(.) may be S-shaped
and the audit probability p is strictly smaller than the ﬁxed point b p, an hypothesis that would
appear reasonable in light of the available estimates of the audit probability (p ∈ [0.01,0.05])
(Andreoni et al, 1998) and of the ﬁxed point (b p ∈ [0.2,0.4]). Second, when Condition 1
is given by ϕ(1 − p) 6 1 − p, the individual may be weakly risk-averse in the sense of
Quiggin (1982) and Yaari (1987). According to these authors, a RDEU decisionmaker is said
to display weak risk-aversion if and only if u(.) is concave and for all π ∈ [0,1], ϕ(π) 6 π,
where π is the probability of a favorable event. When the taxpayer cheats, an audit is
an unfavorable event, since it results in the taxpayer paying a penalty. The favorable event
therefore obtains with probability 1−p. Third, and again for ϕ(1 − p) 6 1−p, the individual
may be strongly risk-averse (which corresponds to an aversion to mean-preserving spreads)
in the sense of Chew, Karni and Safra (1987), which obtains when u(.) is concave and ϕ(.)
8convex. Note that the third assumption is stronger than the second, which in turn is stronger
than the ﬁrst.
A second Proposition obtains when one compares z∗
EU (p;e y,t,θ) and z∗
RDEU (p;e y,t,θ):
Proposition 2 Consider z∗
EU (p;e y,t,θ) and z∗
RDEU (p;e y,t,θ) as deﬁned in equations (7) and
(8), and a probability weighting function which respects Condition 1.T h e n :
p
∗
RDEU (θ) <p
∗
EU (θ),
and
(i) for p<p ∗
RDEU (θ),z ∗
EU (p;.) >z ∗
RDEU (p;.) > 0;
(ii) for p∗
RDEU (θ) 6 p<p ∗
EU (θ),z ∗
EU (p;.) >z ∗
RDEU (p;.)=0 ;
(iii) for p∗
EU (θ) 6 p, z∗
EU (p;.)=z∗
RDEU (p;.)=0 .
Proof. Assume Condition 1, ϕ(1 − p) < 1 − p.R e w r i t e t h i s a s 1 − p − ϕ(1 − p) > 0.
Adding pϕ(1 − p) to both sides yields 1 − p − ϕ(1 − p)+pϕ(1 − p) >p ϕ (1 − p),w h i c h
can be factorized as (1 − p)[1− ϕ(1 − p)] >p ϕ (1 − p). Rearranging this inequality and
dividing both sides by θ yields:
p
∗
EU (θ)=
1 − p
θp
>
ϕ(1 − p)
θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]
= p
∗
RDEU (θ).
Since ψf (f;.) > 0, it follows that:
ψ
µ
1 − p
θp
;.
¶
>ψ
µ
ϕ(1 − p)
θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]
;.
¶
,
which implies that z∗
EU (p;.) >z ∗
RDEU (p;.).T h er e s to fProposition 2 is immediate.
Pessimism is characterized by a convex weighting function. Similarly, optimism corre-
sponds to a concave weighting function (Quiggin, 1982). In the original contribution by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the main factor limiting tax avoidance is the consumer’s
9risk-aversion; RDEU axiomatics allow one to add pessimism to the picture, in the sense of
the consumer’s overweighting of lower-ranked outcomes (in this case, being audited). The
pessimism of individuals leads them to a greater degree of compliance than in the EU case.
We now assume the following:
Condition 2
A(.)=−
u00 (.)
u0 (.)
is decreasing.
Under EU axiomatics, A(.) represents the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk-aversion,
which is assumed to be decreasing in ﬁnal wealth. This assumption is equivalent to that made
by Yitzhaki (1974). Under RDEU axiomatics, risk aversion is not given by the Arrow-Pratt
coeﬃcient (see e.g. Courtault and Gayant, 1998). One may then establish the following
Corollary to Proposition 2 involves a comparison of the magnitude of the comparative
statics under the two axiomatics:
Corollary 1 (comparative statics): For p<p ∗
RDEU (θ) (z∗
EU >z ∗
RDEU > 0), and under
Condition 2, we have:
(i)0 <
dz∗
RDEU
dy
<
dz∗
EU
dy
;
(ii)
dz∗
RDEU
dt
<
dz∗
EU
dt
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The direction of the comparative statics results established in Corollary 1 have been
the subject of much debate in the tax compliance literature (see e.g. Andreoni et al, 1998).
For example, while Feinstein (1991) presents empirical results that correspond to the theo-
retical predictions of EU and RDEU models, Clotefelter (1983) (empirically) and Friedland,
Maital and Rutenberg (1978) or Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992) (experimentally) obtain
the opposite, i.e. dz∗
dt > 0. B et h i sa si tm a y ,t h es i g n so ft h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c si nt h e
Yitzhaki (1974) formulation are similar under EU and RDEU axiomatics, though Corol-
lary 1 shows that quantitative diﬀerences can arise.
10Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 1, which uses the single parameter probability
weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
ϕ(p)=
pγ
[pγ +( 1− p)
γ]
1
γ ,
speciﬁed by Abdellaoui (2000) with γ =0 .7, with a CRRA utility function (u(x)=x1−σ
1−σ ,
σ =1 ,8), and θ =2 , t =0 .30.
p
50%
100 %
y −z∗
               y
RDEU
EU
Figure 1: Compliance rate (
y−z∗
EU
y and
y−z∗
RDEU
y ) as a function of the audit probability (p).
F u l lc o m p l i a n c eo b t a i n sw h e nt h ec o m p l i a n c er a t ec u r v e sr e a c ht h e1 0 0 %l e v e l .A ss h o u l d
be obvious from Figure 1, this occurs for much lower values of p under RDEU axiomatics
than in the EU case.
3N u m e r i c a l s i m u l a t i o n s
Proposition 2 establishes a relationship between the audit probability and the penalty
rate that ensures full compliance, expressed in terms of the threshold audit probabilities:
p
∗
EU (θ)=
1
1+θ
and p
∗
RDEU (θ)=1− ϕ
−1
µ
θ
1+θ
¶
(9)
11Now note that:
∂
¡
p∗
EU (θ) − p∗
RDEU (θ)
¢
∂θ
= −
1
(1 + θ)
2
·
1+ϕ
−1
0 µ
θ
1+θ
¶¸
< 0.
The diﬀerence between p∗
EU (θ) and p∗
RDEU (θ) is thus a decreasing function of the penalty
rate θ. This statement can be formulated in an alternative manner by seeking to determine
the minimal penalty rate that entails full compliance, for a given value of the probability of
audit p. Formally-speaking, these “limit” penalty rates can be expressed as:
θ
∗
EU =
1 − p
p
and θ
∗
RDEU =
ϕ(1 − p)
1 − ϕ(1 − p)
.
Since ϕ(1 − p) < 1 − p,i ti si m m e d i a t et h a tθ
∗
EU >θ
∗
RDEU. It follows that when the penalty
rate θ belongs to the interval [θ
∗
RDEU,θ
∗
EU), RDEU axiomatics predict full compliance, as op-
posed to the EU model under which some cheating will obtain. Generalizing the Allingham-
Sandmo-Yitzhaki model to RDEU axiomatics therefore strengthens the deterrence eﬀect of
the penalty rate.
In what follows, we shall consider the following parameterizations of the probability
weighting function:6
Authors Probability Weighting Function: ϕ(.)
Camerer and Ho (1994)
pβ
(pβ+(1−p)β)
1
β ,β =0 .56
Tversky and Fox (1995)
δpγ
δpγ+(1−p)γ,δ =0 .77 and γ =0 .69
Prelec (1998) exp[−(−ln[p])
α],α =0 .4
Bernasconi (1998) uses the Camerer and Ho (1994) probability weighting function in his
work on tax avoidance. It is clear at this stage that experimental work, in the speciﬁc context
6 While some of these probability weighting functions were developed in a CPT context, they are readily
transposed to the RDEU approach (see e.g. Camerer, 1994). Our simulations, carried out Mathematica 5.0
a r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
12of tax-avoidance, would be extremely useful in setting the parameter values correctly in the
simulations that follow. Given the lack of such experimental evidence, our results should
be taken with a grain of salt, although they are likely to be representative of the broad
diﬀerences between the two parameterizations. The following Table reports the penalty rate
needed to ensure full compliance, as a function of the audit probability, for the following
speciﬁcations.7
p EU Bernasconi Tversky Abdellaoui Prelec
1.0% 99.00 7.39 18.34 16.65 5.81
1.5% 65.66 5.00 13.82 12.75 4.86
2.0% 49.00 3.97 11.29 10.54 4.28
2.5% 39.00 3.36 9.65 9.10 3.87
3.0% 32.33 2.96 8.47 8.05 3.56
3.5% 27.57 2.66 7.59 7.25 3.32
4.0% 24.00 2.43 6.90 6.63 3.12
4.5% 21.22 2.24 6.34 6.12 2.95
5.0% 19.00 2.09 5.87 5.69 2.81
Table 1: Critical penalty rates
The ﬁrst column in Table 1 corresponds to the audit probabilities. The results presented
in Table 1 do not depend upon the speciﬁcation chosen for the utility function. For this
reason, we ﬁnd the Abdellaoui (2000) speciﬁcation (where the probability weighting function
i st h es a m ea si nT v e r s k ya n dF o x ,w i t hδ =0 .84 and γ =0 .65 for losses) particularly
interesting as it is not based on an appeal to a particular functional form for the utility
function.
Using the Prelec (1998) speciﬁcation, Table 2 presents the value of the penalty rate that
7 The “Bernasconi” acronym corresponds to Bernasconi (1998) who used the Camerer and Ho (1994)
speciﬁcation, while “Tversky” corresponds to Tversky and Fox (1995), “Abdellaoui” to Abdellaoui (2000)
and “Prelec” to Prelec (1998).
13ensures full compliance, as a function of the parameter α; for comparison purposes, we also
present the corresponding critical penalty rates under EU axiomatics.8
Prelec probability weighting function
p EU α =0 .2 α =0 .3 α =0 .5 α =0 .6 α =0 .8
1.0% 99.00 2.042 3.496 9.483 15.306 39.15
1.5% 65.66 1.848 3.040 7.644 11.877 28.11
2.0% 49.00 1.720 2.749 6.547 9.901 22.18
2.5% 39.00 1.625 2.540 5.798 8.586 18.43
3.0% 32.33 1.551 2.379 5.244 7.634 15.83
3.5% 27.57 1.490 2.249 4.814 6.906 13.91
4.0% 24.00 1.439 2.142 4.466 6.327 12.42
4.5% 21.22 1.395 2.050 4.178 5.853 11.24
5.0% 19.00 1.357 1.971 3.934 5.456 10.27
T a b l e2 :C r i t i c a lp e n a l t yr a t e sf o rt h eP r e l e cs p e c i ﬁcation
As should be clear from Table 2, the Prelec (1998) speciﬁcation with α =0 .3 yields a sig-
niﬁcant overestimation of low audit probabilities, with full compliance obtaining for an audit
probability of 2% and a penalty rate of 2.75. For this audit probability, the corresponding
threshold penalty rate is equal to 49.0 under EU axiomatics.
An additional exercise involves simulating the rate of compliance (1−z/y) for “realistic”
values of the audit probability and the penalty rate. If we consider the parameterization
chosen by Bernasconi (1998), which involves a CRRA utility function u(x)= x
1−σ
1−σ with
8 As in Table 1, the ﬁrst column corresponds to various audit probabilities (p).
14σ =1 .8, t equal to 0.3,a n dθ =3 , we obtain the simulation results presented in Table 3.
p EU Bernasconi Tversky Abdellaoui Prelec (α =0 .4)
1.0% 0.091 0.745 0.371 0.395 0.722
1.5% 0.140 0.802 0.443 0.465 0.791
2.0% 0.182 0.847 0.500 0.521 0.843
2.5% 0.218 0.883 0.548 0.567 0.886
3.0% 0.252 0.913 0.589 0.606 0.922
3.5% 0.282 0.940 0.626 0.642 0.954
4.0% 0.311 0.964 0.659 0.674 0.982
Table 3: Rates of Compliance, t =0 .3,θ=3and u(x)=
x1−σ
1 − σ
with σ =1 .8.
Here, with α =0 .3, full compliance obtains for audit probabilities greater than 2%;
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Considering the Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki problem under RDEU axiomatics has allowed
us to bridge at least part of the gap between observed levels of compliance and theoretical
predictions. Intuitively, RDEU axiomatics allow one to do this by introducing “pessimism”
into the individual’s decision-making process in that the taxpayer will overestimate the prob-
ability of audit. Several extensions to our approach could be envisaged, such as integrating
occupational choice or labor supply. Contrary to Bernasconi (1998), we believe that social
or ethical factors may still constitute an important portion of the tax compliance puzzle,
insofar as they aﬀect the probability weighting function, although we have not developed this
point here. Experimental evidence would be extremely useful in this context. An example
includes the concept of “competence” as deﬁned by Heath and Tversky (1991), which ex-
plains the use of accountants for establishing tax returns. Another is the model of Pestieau,
15Possen and Slustky (1998) who consider, in an EU context, a lottery in terms of the tax
code. A similar lottery under Non EU axiomatics would allow one to distinguish individuals
according to their aversion to ambiguity, as deﬁned by Ellsberg (1961).
5 Appendix: Proof of Corollary 1
We begin by rewriting the FOCs under the two axiomatics (EU and RDEU), where one
denotes e y explicitly by y(1 − t) and where we restrict our attention to situations where
p<p ∗
RDEU (θ):
t
£
(1 − p)u
0 ¡
y(1 − t)+tz
∗
EU
¢
− θpu
0 ¡
y(1 − t) − θtz
∗
EU
¢¤
=0 , (10)
t



ϕ(1 − p)u0 ¡
y(1 − t)+tz∗
RDEU
¢
−θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]u0 ¡
y(1 − t) − θtz∗
RDEU
¢


 =0 . (11)
An application of the Implicit Function Theorem to (10) then yields:
dz∗
EU
dy
= −
(1 − t)
£
(1 − p)u00 ¡
wN
EU
¢
− θpu00 ¡
wA
EU
¢¤
t
£
(1 − p)u00 ¡
wN
EU
¢
+ θ
2pu00¡
wA
EU
¢¤ .
In order to lighten notation, let wN be the taxpayer’s income when she is not audited
(w
N = e y + tz), whereas wA corresponds to her income when she is (wN = e y − θtz). The
subscript corresponds to the axiomatics being used. Moreover, we deﬁne A(.)=−
u00(.)
u0(.) as
the “sensitivity” of marginal utility, where we assume Condition 2 respected.
From the FOCs, we know that:
u
0 ¡
w
A
EU
¢
=
1 − p
θp
u
0 ¡
w
N
EU
¢
, (12)
and
u
0 ¡
w
A
RDEU
¢
=
ϕ(1 − p)
θ[1 − ϕ(1 − p)]
u
0 ¡
w
N
RDEU
¢
. (13)
16Substituting for A(.), combining this with (12) and simplifying by (1 − p) and u0 ¡
wN
EU
¢
,
then yields:
dz∗
EU
dy
=
(1 − t)
£
A
¡
wA
EU
¢
− A
¡
wN
EU
¢¤
t
£
A
¡
wN
EU
¢
+ θA
¡
wA
EU
¢¤ .
Since A(.) is assumed to be decreasing (Condition 2), it follows, since wA
EU <w N
EU,t h a t
A
¡
wA
EU
¢
>A
¡
wN
EU
¢
. The consequence, since the denominator is the SOC and is therefore
negative, is that
dz∗
EU
dy > 0. Similarly, one can compute:
dz∗
RDEU
dy
=
(1 − t)
£
A
¡
wA
RDEU
¢
− A
¡
wN
RDEU
¢¤
t[A(wN
RDEU)+θA(wA
RDEU)]
> 0.
Our purpose here is to prove part (i) of the Corollary,n a m e l yt h a t
dz∗
RDEU
dy <
dz∗
EU
dy .A n
important consequence of part (i) of Proposition 1 is that:
w
N
EU >w
N
RDEU >w
A
RDEU >w
A
EU.
Since A(.) is decreasing, it follows that
A
¡
w
N
EU
¢
<A
¡
w
N
RDEU
¢
<A
¡
w
A
RDEU
¢
<A
¡
w
A
EU
¢
, (14)
and therefore
A
¡
w
N
EU
¢
A
¡
w
A
RDEU
¢
<A
¡
w
N
RDEU
¢
A
¡
w
A
EU
¢
,
which implies that
dz∗
RDEU
dy
<
dz∗
EU
dy
.
This proves part (i) of Corollary 1. For part (ii) of Corollary 1,i m p l i c i td i ﬀerentiation
of the FOC (10) and use of (12) and (14) yields:
dz∗
EU
dt
= −
y
£
A
¡
wA
EU
¢
− A
¡
wN
EU
¢¤
+ z∗
EU
£
θA
¡
wA
EU
¢
+ A
¡
wN
EU
¢¤
t
£
A
¡
wN
EU
¢
+ θA
¡
wA
EU
¢¤ < 0.
17In the case of RDEU, similar computations yield:
dz∗
RDEU
dt
= −
y
£
A
¡
wA
RDEU
¢
− A
¡
wN
RDEU
¢¤
+ z∗
RDEU
£
θA
¡
wA
RDEU
¢
+ A
¡
wN
RDEU
¢¤
t
£
A
¡
wN
RDEU
¢
+ θA
¡
wA
RDEU
¢¤ < 0.
T h en e x ts t e pi st oc o m p a r e
dz∗
EU
dt and
dz∗
RDEU
dt , where we can write:
dz∗
RDEU
dt
=
dz∗
EU
dt
Ã
A
¡
wN
EU
¢
+ θA
¡
wA
EU
¢
A
¡
wN
RDEU
¢
+ θA
¡
wA
RDEU
¢
!
Ã
y
£
A
¡
wA
RDEU
¢
− A
¡
wN
RDEU
¢¤
+ z∗
RDEU
£
θA
¡
wA
RDEU
¢
+ A
¡
wN
RDEU
¢¤
y
£
A
¡
wA
EU
¢
− A
¡
wN
EU
¢¤
+ z∗
EU
£
θA
¡
wA
EU
¢
+ A
¡
wN
EU
¢¤
!
.
We will now prove that:
µ
A(wN
EU)+θA(wA
EU)
A(wN
RDEU)+θA(wA
RDEU)
¶µ
y[A(wA
RDEU)−A(wN
RDEU)]+z∗
RDEU[θA(wA
RDEU)+A(wN
RDEU)]
y[A(wA
EU)−A(wN
EU)]+z∗
EU[θA(wA
EU)+A(wN
EU)]
¶
< 1.
Note that the preceding inequality is equivalent to:
¡
A
¡
w
N
EU
¢
+ θA
¡
w
A
EU
¢¢¡¡
y + θz
∗
RDEU
¢
A
¡
w
A
RDEU
¢
−
¡
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A
¡
w
N
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<
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¡
w
N
RDEU
¢
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A
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∗
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−
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N
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,
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¢
A
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w
N
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¢
A
¡
w
A
RDEU
¢
−
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.
Cancelling out terms then implies that this boils down to:
A
¡
w
N
EU
¢
A
¡
w
A
RDEU
¢
<A
¡
w
A
EU
¢
A
¡
w
N
RDEU
¢
,
18whence,
dz∗
RDEU
dt
<
dz∗
EU
dt
[QED].
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